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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 February 1960

#### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: New data released by the USSR on its 1959 census will affect some of our estimates on the composition of the Soviet population. Fewer people will enter working- and military-age groups during 1959-65 than we had estimated. The number of people now in the working-age bracket (16-59) is some 2,000,000 less than had been thought, and, of the total population in this age group (125,600,000), a higher percentage is already working. Opportunities to expand the labor force are thus more limited than previously estimated. Khrushchev's program to cut armed forces strength was probably based in part on a desire to enlarge the labor force.

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USSR - China - East Europe: In view of the top-level participation in the "agricultural conference" held in Moscow on 2-3 February, it is probable that the problems discussed went beyond the routine agricultural matters dealt with in the 4 February communique. The absence of Chinese Communist representatives suggests that the Chinese feared a discussion of collectivization would involve the commune problem and would be critical of their methods.

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#### POPULATION OF THE USSR 15 JANUARY 1959

(MILLION PERSONS)

AGE GROUP	USSR CENSUS DATA	PREVIOUS US ESTIMATES
0-9	46.4	45.1
10-15	17. 1	17. 9
16-19	14. 7	16.0
20-59	110.9	111.7
60 & OVER	19. <i>7</i>	7.
TOTAL	208.8	208-8
ABLE BODIED AGES *	119.8	122.2

Men, 16-59; women, 16-54.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan: Western diplomats in Khartoum feel that the next few weeks will be crucial in determining the Sudanese Government's alignment between East and West. Sudanese officials, who had expected that the agreement they reached on 8 November with the UAR on sharing the Nile waters would quickly lead to a World Bank loan covering much of the cost of their \$100,000,000 Roseires Dam project, have become convinced that the bank is "stalling," They are also perturbed about limitations of the US aid program, especially in view of the recent large Soviet loans to the UAR and Ethiopia. Late last week the Sudanese foreign minister told the French ambassador that he intended to apply to the USSR for aid.

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#### III. THE WEST

France: De Gaulle's ouster of Deputy Premier Jacques Soustelle and other changes indicate De Gaulle's determination to implement vigorously his self-determination policy for Algeria. Far-reaching administrative and possibly territorial reorganization of Algeria now is probably under consideration. Soustelle is likely to retain the support of some elements of the Union for the New Republic which he founded. He has announced that he will continue working for the "cause of French Algeria." The appointment of the former French

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DAILY BRIEF

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	to replace Pierre provides De Gaul	commissioner general, Pi Guillaumat as minister of le with a vigorous persona e-up in the army.	armed forces	] 25X
0K 25X1	public invitation t sumption of diplo certain. Mikoyar specialists and C	Fidel Castro will probably to visit Moscow "in the near matic relations with the Un's delegation is heavily we uba is expected to respond to pomic overtures.	r future." Re- SSR seems almost eighted with trade	
N <sup>O</sup>	the two Latin Am apparently without where such candi lic announcement of this year. Cut tral support in the Latin Americ	uba has launched its candierican seats in the UN Sect consulting the Latin Amedacies are usually agreed. Argentina will vacate its a may siphon off Commune UN from any candidate a an caucus. However, the nembers regard the Castronlikely	eurity Council, erican caucus upon before pub- s seat at the end hist and some neu- greed upon by wariness with	25X
	Cuba's election u	mikeiv.		
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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### Bloc Agricultural Conference in Moscow

In view of the top-level participation in the agricultural conference held in Moscow on 2-3 February, it seems likely that the problems discussed went beyond the routine production and technical issues reported. The subject matter covered by the communiqué hardly warrants attendance by every Eastern European first secretary and premier, some of whom left their own countries in the midst of meetings of their own.

A reference in the communiqué to the accomplishments of the European countries in "the socialist reorganization of the countryside" may be a clue to the absence of the Chinese. This topic, if discussed at length, could hardly fail to involve the communes. Absence of the Chinese at such a discussion would underline their intention to maintain their own position on this problem. The failure of the communiqué to explain the necessity of such high-level participation implies that Khrushchev wishes to give no more publicity than is necessary to a serious difference of view within the bloc.

The absence of Chinese Communist representatives was made conspicuous by the presence of representatives from North Korea and Outer Mongolia "at their own request." The Chinese did participate in two CEMA technical conferences held during the same period, and in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 4 February.

The decision to call a meeting of	f party representatives
rather than to use the forum of the Sc	oviet bloc's Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA	a)whose meetings are
normally attended by Chinese observ	erssuggests that the
agricultural "experiences" discussed	d were more in the ideo-
logical than in the technical field.	
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## Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900300001-4 II. ASIA-AFRICA

#### III. THE WEST

#### De Gaulle's Cabinet Changes Signal Extensive Shake-up

De Gaulle's determination to push his policy of self-determination for Algeria is indicated by his ouster of Deputy Premier Jacques Soustelle and other 5 January ministerial changes which emphasize the increasingly "technical" rather than political character of the cabinet. Although Premier Debré reportedly opposed the use of force against the European settler insurgents last week, De Gaulle may have reasoned that replacing him at present would create too many difficulties at a time when he wants to push his purge of those who oppose his policies, particularly since the special decree power granted the government would have to be renewed if a new premier took over. Two other opponents to the use of force--Information Minister Frey and Armed Forces Minister Guillaumat--who are technicians rather than political figures, were relegated to positions under Debré.

Pierre Messmer, the former French West Africa high commissioner general, who replaces Guillaumat, is a career civil servant whose vigorous personality has probably recommended him to De Gaulle as the man to carry out the expected shake-up of the army. Messmer's combination of toughness with a liberal record in the evolution of the French Community is certain to alarm the rightists.

Soustelle's departure formalizes a long-existing split in the "Gaullist" Union for the New Republic (UNR) which he helped to found. His immediate announcement following his ouster that he intends to continue working for "the cause of French Algeria" suggests he will fight to retain the support of many UNR deputies at odds with the "loyal" elements who seized control of the party machinery at the annual congress last December. Soustelle could serve as a dangerous focal point of opposition to De Gaulle, in cooperation with the die-hard members of the Independent party who demonstrated their sympathies with the European settlers in Algeria.

<b>I</b> n addit	ion to tl	he pur	ge o	of civil	and	militar	y hi	erarchie	es
which is nov	v under	way,	<b>D</b> e	<b>G</b> aulle	also	appare		intends	to

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use the special decree powers to make some far-reaching
changes in Algeria. According to the American Embassy
in Paris, several parliamentary leaders have quoted De Gaulle
as indicating on 3 February that preparations must be made
for the eventuality of a federated state of Algeria. De Gaulle
reportedly guaranted that the sure of Algeria. De Gaulle
reportedly suggested that the present departmental divisions
of Algeria needed revision, possibly along ethnic lines

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#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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